I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose Alice, who is in New York, wants to have an action taken on her behalf in Prague. There she has two agents, Bob and Charlie, who can carry it out for her, but she knows that one of them, and only one, is dishonest and she does not know which is the honest one. She cannot simply send a message to both, because the dishonest one will try to sabotage the action, but she knows that if the two of them carry out the message, the honest one will keep the dishonest one from doing any damage. What can she do?

Classical cryptography provides an answer that is known as secret sharing [1]. It can be used, for example, to guarantee that no single person can open a vault, has access to an industrial secret, or can launch a missile with a nuclear warhead, but two together can. This means that for security to be breached, two people must act in concert, thereby making it more difficult for any single person who wants to gain illegal access to the secret information; he must convince the other party to go along and he risks discovery in the process.

How can Alice implement this procedure? From her original message, she creates two coded messages, one of which is sent to Bob and the other to Charlie. Each of the encrypted messages contains no information about her original message, but together they contain the complete message. Therefore, neither Bob nor Charlie alone can find out what Alice wants to do, but the two of them acting together can. This can be accomplished by taking the original message, which we can think of as a binary bit string, and adding to it a random bit string of the same length. The addition is done modulo 2 and bitwise. Alice then takes this string and a copy of the random string and sends one to Bob and the other to Charlie. At this point neither is in a position to learn Alice’s message. However, if they get together and add their two strings together, bitwise and modulo 2, Alice’s message emerges. There are also classical protocols that allow Alice to split her message into more than two parts.

So far we have not mentioned the problem of eavesdropping, but this is something Alice must consider. If either a fourth party or the dishonest member of the Bob-Charlie pair gains access to both of Alice’s transmissions, then they can learn the contents of her message. Eavesdroppers can, however, be defeated by using quantum cryptographic protocols. Quantum cryptography provides for the secure transmission of information by enabling one to determine whether an eavesdropper has attempted to gain information about the key that is being used to encode the message [2–4]. If not, the key can be used and the information sent by using it will be secure; if an eavesdropper has been detected, then one has to establish a new key.

We would like to show that it is possible to combine quantum cryptography with secret sharing in a way that will allow one to determine whether an eavesdropper has been active during the secret sharing protocol. The most obvious way of doing this is simply for Alice to use quantum cryptographic protocols to send each of the bit strings that result from the classical secret sharing procedure. This method will work; it is, however, awkward. One first must establish mutual keys among different pairs of parties, in this case one for Alice and Bob and another for Alice and Charlie, and then implement the classical procedure. The classical procedure, it should be pointed out, becomes more and more complicated the larger the number of pieces into which one wants to split the message. We would like to explore an alternative that uses quantum mechanics to do both the information splitting and the eavesdropper protection simultaneously. By using multiparticle entanglement, it eliminates the need to perform the classical secret-splitting procedure altogether.

The method for splitting a message into two parts that we present here uses maximally entangled three-particle states, or Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states, and it can be easily extended in two different ways. First, it can be modified to allow Alice to send a string of quantum bits (qubits) to Bob and Charlie in such a way that only by working together can they determine what the string is. In this case it is quantum information that has been split into two pieces, neither of which separately contains the original information, but whose combination does. Second, the procedure can also be generalized to more than three parties and we show explicitly how it works with four.

GHZ states have already found a number of uses. They form the basis of a very stringent test of local realistic theories [6]. Recently it was also proposed that they can be used for cryptographic conferencing or for multiparticle generalizations of superdense coding [7]. In addition, related states
can be used to reduce communication complexity [8]. Quantum
secret sharing represents yet another application.

II. GHZ STATES AND SECRET SHARING

Let us suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie each have one
particle from a GHZ triplet that is in the state
\[
|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|000\rangle + |111\rangle).
\]
(1)
They each choose at random whether to measure their par-
ticle in the x or y direction. They then announce publicly in
which direction they have made a measurement, but not the
results of their measurements. Half the time, Bob and Char-
lie, by combining the results of their measurements, can de-
termine what the result of Alice’s measurement was. This
allows Alice to establish a joint key with Bob and Charlie,
which she can then use to send her message.

Let us see how this works in more detail. Define the x and
y eigenstates
\[
|+x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \quad |+y\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + i|1\rangle),
\]
\[
|-x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle - |1\rangle), \quad |-y\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle - i|1\rangle).
\]
(2)
We can see the effects of measurements by Alice and Bob on
the state of Charlie’s particle if we express the GHZ state in
different ways. Noting that
\[
|0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|+x\rangle + |-x\rangle), \quad |1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|+x\rangle - |-x\rangle),
\]
(3)
we can write
\[
|\psi\rangle = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2}} [(|+x\rangle_a |+x\rangle_b + |-x\rangle_a |-x\rangle_b) (|0\rangle_c + |1\rangle_c) \\
+ (|+x\rangle_a |-x\rangle_b + |-x\rangle_a |+x\rangle_b) (|0\rangle_c - |1\rangle_c)].
\]
(4)
This decomposition of |\psi\rangle tells us what happens if both
Alice and Bob make measurements in the x direction. If they
both get the same result, then Charlie will have the state
(|0\rangle_c + |1\rangle_c)/\sqrt{2}; if they get different results, he will have
the state (|0\rangle_c - |1\rangle_c)/\sqrt{2}. He can determine which of these
states he has by performing a measurement along the x di-
rection. The following table summarizes the effects of
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements on Charlie’s state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>+x</th>
<th>-x</th>
<th>+y</th>
<th>-y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+x</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0) +</td>
<td>1\rangle</td>
<td>(0) -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-x</td>
<td>(0) -</td>
<td>1\rangle</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0) +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+y</td>
<td>(0) -</td>
<td>i\rangle(1)</td>
<td>(0) +</td>
<td>i\rangle(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-y</td>
<td>(0) +</td>
<td>1\rangle</td>
<td>(0) -</td>
<td>1\rangle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alice’s measurements are given in the columns and Bob’s
are given in the rows. Charlie’s state, up to normalization,
appears in the boxes. From the table it is clear that if Charlie
knows what measurements Alice and Bob made (that is, x or
y), he can determine whether their results are the same or
opposite and also that he will gain no knowledge of what
their results actually are. Similarly, Bob will not be able to
determine what Alice’s result is without Charlie’s assistance
because he does not know if his result is the same as Alice’s
or the opposite of hers.

With each party choosing to make x or y measurements at
random, only half of the GHZ triplets will give useful re-
sults. For example, if Alice and Bob both measure their par-
ticles in the x direction, Charlie must also measure his in the
x direction in order to determine whether the results of Al-
iece’s and Bob’s measurements are correlated or anticorre-
related; if he measures in the y direction he gains no infor-
mation. Because Charlie is choosing his measurement direction
at random, he will choose correctly only half the time. This
is why all three parties must announce the directions of their
measurements so that they can decide whether to keep or to
discard the results from a given triplet. This announcement
should be done in the following way: Bob and Charlie both
send to Alice the direction of their measurements, who then
sends all three measurement directions to Bob and Charlie.

Before presenting a more general discussion of eaves-
dropping, we shall consider a specific situation in order to
show that it can be detected. Suppose that Bob is dishonest
and that he has managed to get a hold of Charlie’s particle as
well as his own. He then measures the two particles and
sends one of them on to Charlie. His object is to discover
what Alice’s bit is, without any assistance from Charlie, and
to do so in a way that cannot be detected. Alice has measured
her particle in either the x or y direction, but Bob does not
know which. He would like to measure the quantum state of
his two-particle system, but because he does not know what
measurement Alice made, he does not know whether to
make his in the (|00\rangle ± |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2} basis or in the (|00\rangle
± |i\rangle |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2} basis. Choosing at random he has a probability
of 1/2 of making a mistake. If he chooses correctly, he will
know, for valid combinations of measurement axes, what the
result of Charlie’s measurement is from the result of his own;
this means that he will then know what Alice’s bit is. For ex-
ample, if Alice measured in the x direction and found
|+x\rangle, then the state Bob receives is (|00\rangle + |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2}. If Bob
now measures in the (|00\rangle ± |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2} basis, he knows what the
two-particle state is and because
\[
\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle + |11\rangle) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|+x\rangle |+x\rangle + |-x\rangle |-x\rangle),
\]
(5)
Bob knows that Charlie’s measurement will produce a result
identical to his.

What happens if he is wrong? Suppose that Alice has
measured her particle in the y direction and that Bob mes-
ures his particles in the (|00\rangle ± |11\rangle)/\sqrt{2} basis. He has a
probability of 1/2 of getting either basis vector. He now
sends one of his particles to Charlie, and both Bob and Char-
lie measure their particles. Because Alice measured y, in or-
der for this round of measurements to produce a valid key
bit, Bob and Charlie must make different measurements, i.e., one must measure $x$ and the other $y$. We note that in the $\frac{Q}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle \pm |11\rangle)$ basis there is no correlation between $x$ and $y$ measurements, for example,

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle + |11\rangle) = \frac{1}{2} [e^{-i\pi/4}(|+x\rangle|+y\rangle + |−x\rangle|−y\rangle) + e^{i\pi/4}(|+x\rangle|−y\rangle + |−x\rangle|+y\rangle)].$$

Therefore, in half the situations the results of the measurements will be wrong. If, for example, Alice found $|+y\rangle$ and Bob found $|+x\rangle$, then Charlie should measure $|−y\rangle$ if he measures his particle in the $y$ direction, but because of Bob’s measurement, he has a probability of 1/2 of finding $|+y\rangle$. The overall probability of an error in this cheating scheme is 1/4, one-half of picking the wrong basis and then one-half of getting the wrong result.

There are two additional points to notice here. First, if Bob were able to learn the direction of Alice’s and Charlie’s measurements before having to reveal his, he could cheat more successfully. In the cases in which he made the wrong measurement, Bob could simply tell Alice a measurement direction that would cause the results from that triplet to be thrown out. Alice and Charlie would, however, notice a higher than usual failure rate, 75% as opposed to 50%, which would tell them that something unusual was happening. Insisting that Bob send a measurement direction to Alice before learning what kind of measurement Alice and Charlie have made, makes this kind of cheating more difficult. Second, there is also the possibility that Bob could lie at certain points in the procedure; he could lie about his measurement direction or about the result of his measurement. In the cheating scheme considered above, however, he gains nothing by doing so.

Now let us look at a more general situation. We assume that there is an eavesdropper Eve (who could also be either Bob or Charlie). Her problem, as in the example that we just discussed, is that she does not know what bases have been or will be used to measure the particles. If she measures them herself and chooses the wrong bases, she will introduce errors that Alice, Bob, and Charlie will be able to detect by publicly comparing a subset of their measurements.

In order to show this for a large class of measurements, let us assume that Eve has been able to entangle an ancilla with the three-particle state that Alice, Bob, and Charlie are using. At some later time she can measure the ancilla to gain information about the measurement results of Alice, Bob, and Charlie. The state describing the state of the three particles and the ancilla is

$$|\Psi\rangle = \sum_{j,k,n=0}^{1} |jkn\rangle_3 |R_{jkn}\rangle_\xi,$$

where $|jkn\rangle_3$ is a state of the three particles and $|R_{jkn}\rangle_\xi$ is an unnormalized ancilla state. What we wish to show is that if this entanglement introduces no errors into the secret sharing procedure, then $|\Psi\rangle$ must be a product of a GHZ triplet and the ancilla. This implies that Eve will gain no information about measurements on the triplet from observing the ancilla or, conversely, if Eve is to gain information about Alice’s bit, she must invariably introduce errors.

First, suppose that Alice, Bob, and Charlie all measure their particles in the $x$ basis. If no errors are to occur we must have that

$$p(C = +x|A = \pm x, B = \pm x) = 1,$$
$$p(C = -x|A = \pm x, B = \mp x) = 1,$$

where $p(C = +x|A = +x, B = +x)$ is the probability that Charlie measures $+x$ given that both Alice and Bob measure $+x$ and the other quantities are similarly defined. These equations imply that

$$P(+x, +x, -x)|\Psi\rangle = 0, \quad P(-x, -x, -x)|\Psi\rangle = 0,$$
$$P(+x, -x, +x)|\Psi\rangle = 0, \quad P(-x, +x, +x)|\Psi\rangle = 0,$$

where $P(+x, +x, -x)$ is the projection onto the subspace of the three-particle–ancilla Hilbert space in which Alice’s particle is in the $+x$ direction, Bob’s is in the $+x$ direction, and Charlie’s is in the $-x$ direction. The other projection operators are defined in a similar manner. Expressing the conditions in Eq. (9) in the $z$ basis (the $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$ basis), we find that if projection operators corresponding to any of the vectors

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|000\rangle_3 - |111\rangle_3), \quad \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|100\rangle_3 - |011\rangle_3),$$
$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|010\rangle_3 - |101\rangle_3), \quad \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|110\rangle_3 - |001\rangle_3)$$

act on $|\Psi\rangle$, the result is zero.

Now suppose that Alice measures her particle in the $x$ basis and Bob and Charlie measure theirs in the $y$ basis. In order for there to be no errors we must have that

$$p(C = -y|A = \pm x, B = \pm y) = 1,$$
$$p(C = +y|A = \pm x, B = \mp y) = 1,$$

which imply that

$$P(+x, +y, +y)|\Psi\rangle = 0, \quad P(-x, -y, +y)|\Psi\rangle = 0,$$
$$P(+x, -y, -y)|\Psi\rangle = 0, \quad P(-x, +y, -y)|\Psi\rangle = 0.$$
measures his in the $x$ direction, and Charlie measures his in the $y$ direction. These conditions imply that $|\Psi\rangle$ must be of the form

$$|\Psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|000\rangle_{3} + |111\rangle_{3})R_{\xi},$$

(14)
i.e., a product of the GHZ state and an ancilla state, which is what we wished to show.

Finally, let us conclude this section with a discussion of the resources necessary to implement quantum secret sharing protocols. In order to send a shared key containing $N$ bits it is necessary to use, on average, $2N$ GHZ triplets. If we instead use standard quantum cryptography and the classical secret sharing protocol, then either $4N$ entangled pairs, using the Ekert procedure [3], or $4N$ particles, using the BB84 procedure [2], are required. In all cases, the number of particles sent from Alice to Bob and Charlie is $4N$. In the GHZ scheme, once the key has been established, Alice needs to send $N$ classical bits in order to transmit the message. These bits can be sent to either Bob or Charlie using a public channel. In the hybrid quantum-classical scheme Alice must send $2N$ classical bits once keys with Bob and Charlie have been established: $N$ bits to send the random string to Charlie and another $N$ bits to send to Bob the string resulting from the bitwise XOR of the message and the random string. In general, the more parts into which the secret is split, the greater the difference between the number of classical bits that must be sent in the hybrid scheme and in the entangled-state scheme ($MN$ versus $N$ for a secret split into $M$ parts). We see that entanglement is able to act as a substitute for transmitted random bits.

III. SPLITTING OF QUANTUM INFORMATION

Now suppose that Alice has a string of qubits she would like to send to Bob and Charlie in such a way that they must cooperate in order to extract the quantum information. She can use shared GHZ triplets $|000\rangle_{abc} + |111\rangle_{abc}$ and a procedure very similar to quantum teleportation to do this [5]. The no-cloning theorem implies that only one copy of Alice’s qubit can be received, so that either Bob or Charlie, but not both, will possess the final qubit [9]. The procedure we shall present is symmetric in that either party can end up with the final qubit, but information from the other party is required before this can happen. Security could be enforced by requiring that Bob and Charlie meet in person to exchange the final information and put the qubit to its final use. Let us now look in detail at the procedure for sending one qubit. We shall first describe the protocol and then discuss the reasons for some of the steps.

Alice begins by taking her qubit, which is in the state $\alpha|0\rangle_{A} + \beta|1\rangle_{A}$, combining it with her GHZ particle, and measuring the pair in the Bell basis

$$|\Psi_{+}\rangle_{AA} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|00\rangle_{AA} ± |11\rangle_{AA}),$$

$$|\Phi_{+}\rangle_{AA} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle_{AA} ± |10\rangle_{AA}).$$

(15)

We can determine the effect of this measurement on the particles that Bob and Charlie possess by expressing the entire four-particle state as

$$|\Psi\rangle_{4} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ |\Psi_{+}\rangle_{AA}|\alpha00\rangle_{bc} + |\beta11\rangle_{bc} + |\Psi_{-}\rangle_{AA}|\alpha00\rangle_{bc} ± \beta11\rangle_{bc} + |\Phi_{+}\rangle_{AA}|\alpha00\rangle_{bc} + |\beta11\rangle_{bc} + |\Phi_{-}\rangle_{AA}|\alpha00\rangle_{bc} ± \beta11\rangle_{bc} \right].$$

(16)

At this point Alice does not tell either Bob or Charlie what the result of her measurement is. This implies that the single-particle density matrices of both Bob’s and Charlie’s particles are $(1/2)I$, where $I$ is the $2\times2$ identity matrix, so that at this stage of the procedure neither Bob nor Charlie has any information about Alice’s qubit. Alice now tells either Bob or Charlie (she makes the choice at random) to measure his particle. It is the person who has not been chosen whose particle will contain the final qubit. The party that has been chosen to make the measurement, whom we shall assume to be Bob for this particular qubit, now measures his particle in the $x$ direction, obtaining either $|+x\rangle_{b}$ or $|-x\rangle_{b}$. This still leaves Charlie’s single-particle density matrix as $(1/2)I$, i.e., he still has no information about Alice’s qubit.

In order to reconstruct Alice’s qubit Charlie needs two bits of classical information from Alice (which of the four Bell states she found) and one from Bob. Alice first verifies that both parties have received a particle, which we assume can be done over a public channel, and then sends Charlie the result of her measurement. If Alice’s result was either $|\Psi_{+}\rangle_{AA}$ or $|\Psi_{-}\rangle_{AA}$, then Charlie’s single-particle density matrix is

$$\rho_{c} = |\alpha|^{2}|0\rangle_{c}\langle 0 | + |\beta|^{2}|1\rangle_{c}\langle 1 |;$$

(17)

if the result was either $|\Phi_{+}\rangle_{AA}$ or $|\Phi_{-}\rangle_{AA}$, then it is

$$\rho_{c} = |\beta|^{2}|0\rangle_{c}\langle 0 | + |\alpha|^{2}|1\rangle_{c}\langle 1 |.$$  

(18)

Charlie now has amplitude information about Alice’s qubit, but knows nothing about its phase. Bob’s one bit of classical information, in conjunction with the quantum information he now has, will give him the phase information and allow him to reconstruct Alice’s qubit. In particular, the transformations that Charlie should perform in order to obtain Alice’s qubit, up to an overall sign, are

$$|\Psi_{+}\rangle_{AA} + x\rangle_{b} → I, \quad |\Phi_{+}\rangle_{AA} + x\rangle_{b} → \sigma_{x},$$

$$|\Psi_{+}\rangle_{AA} - x\rangle_{b} → \sigma_{z}, \quad |\Phi_{+}\rangle_{AA} - x\rangle_{b} → \sigma_{x}\sigma_{z},$$

$$|\Psi_{-}\rangle_{AA} + x\rangle_{b} → \sigma_{z}, \quad |\Phi_{-}\rangle_{AA} + x\rangle_{b} → \sigma_{x}\sigma_{z},$$

$$|\Psi_{-}\rangle_{AA} - x\rangle_{b} → I, \quad |\Phi_{-}\rangle_{AA} - x\rangle_{b} → \sigma_{x}.$$  

(19)

We see, then, that Charlie can reconstruct Alice’s state, but only with the assistance of Bob. Bob must both measure his particle and send the result to Charlie. Without Bob’s information, Charlie has no information about the phase of Alice’s state.

Let us now discuss this procedure. We are making the assumption that any communication over a classical channel is insecure. This means we cannot consider the simplest
method of splitting the quantum information in Alice’s qubit, which is just to use standard teleportation with an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair and send the classical information to Bob and the second particle in the EPR pair to Charlie [10]. That is why the procedure we have outlined above is somewhat more complicated. Note that we could securely implement this protocol if Alice sent her two bits using standard quantum cryptography. She would operate on average, however, need four particles to do so and an entangled pair to implement the teleportation procedure. In addition, this procedure will require that five measurements be made on average. The scheme we have presented requires a single GHZ triplet and two measurements. In effect, it substitutes entanglement for quantum-mechanically implemented classical communication.

Our next task is to see how it protects against cheating and eavesdropping. Let us first note that Alice’s ability to choose which particle, Bob’s or Charlie’s, is to receive the final qubit prevents cheating by one of the parties if they manage to get hold of both of the particles that Alice sends. Suppose, for example, that Charlie is dishonest, that he has managed to obtain both particles, and that he has sent a particle that he has prepared to Bob. If Alice chooses Charlie to receive the qubit, his cheating will go undetected; once Charlie has the result of Alice’s measurement he has her qubit and the result of Bob’s measurement is irrelevant. On the other hand, if she chooses Bob, then Charlie has a problem. At the time he sent the particle to Bob, Charlie did not know the result of Alice’s measurement and therefore the particle he sent to Bob is not in the proper quantum state. Alice and Bob can detect this by comparing a subset of the states Bob received to the ones Alice sent, which would reveal Charlie’s cheating.

This procedure also guarantees that if an eavesdropper or a cheater has entangled an ancilla with the three-particle state, then errors will be introduced. If the GHZ state in the above protocol is replaced by the state in Eq. (7), then one can show, using an argument similar to the one in Sec. II, that if no errors are introduced by the addition of the ancilla, then the state $|\Psi\rangle$ is just a product of the GHZ state and an ancilla state. This again implies that measurements on the ancilla will tell an eavesdropper nothing about the state of the three particles held by Alice, Bob, and Charlie.

IV. FOUR-PARTICLE GHZ STATE

It is possible to generalize this procedure to split information among more than two people. Let us look specifically at the case of three. Alice starts with a four-particle GHZ state

$$|\psi\rangle_4 = \frac{1}{4\sqrt{2}} \left[ \sum_j (|+x\rangle_j + |-x\rangle_j) + \sum_j (|+y\rangle_j + |-y\rangle_j) \right],$$

(21)

where $j$ runs over the set {Alice, Bob, Charlie, Diana}, we see that the right-hand side is an equal superposition of all four-particle basis states, where each single-particle state is in the $x$ basis, with an even number of $-x$ states. This means that if all four people have each measured their particles in the $x$ direction, then Bob, Charlie, and Diana can, by combining their results, determine what the result of Alice’s measurement was. They simply count the number of $-x$ measurements. If it is even, then Alice must have found $+x$; and if it is odd, then Alice must have measured $-x$. It is necessary for all three of them to combine their information in order to determine Alice’s result; no subset will do. Therefore, Alice has succeeded in splitting her message into three parts.

In order to foil eavesdroppers and cheaters, the four parties do not want to use only a single basis, so we must examine what happens if different combinations of $x$ and $y$ bases are used. Expressing $|\psi\rangle_4$ in the $y$ basis, we find that it is an equal superposition of all four-particle basis states, where each single-particle state is in the $y$ basis, with an even number of $-y$ states. This allows Bob, Charlie, and Diana to determine Alice’s state in the same way as in the $x$ basis case. If two of the particles are expressed in the $x$ basis and two in the $y$ basis, then we see that $|\psi\rangle_4$ is an equal superposition of the 16 basis vectors with two particles in the $x$ basis and two in the $y$ basis (with the same two in the $x$ basis and the same two in the $y$ basis in each of the four-particle basis vectors) that have an odd number of minus states. For example, if the first two particles are in the $x$ basis and the second two in the $y$ basis, the states $|+x\rangle|+y\rangle$ and $|-x\rangle|+y\rangle$ would appear in the expansion of $|\psi\rangle_4$. Again, Bob, Charlie, and Diana can determine Alice’s state by counting the number of minus states that appeared as results of their measurements.

If three particles are expressed in one basis and the remaining one in the other, then $|\psi\rangle_4$ is a superposition of all 16 basis vectors. This means that there are no correlations among the measurements that will allow Bob, Charlie, and Diana to infer the result of Alice’s measurement. If all four parties are choosing their bases at random, this means that in half the cases, they will not be able to use the results.

Summarizing, each of the four parties performs a measurement on their particle in either the $x$ or $y$ basis. They then communicate their choice of basis to Alice (classically), who decides if the overall basis choice is a usable one, and she then communicates all four basis choices to each of the other three parties. Using this information and the results of their measurements, they can, if they act in concert, determine the result of Alice’s measurement. This means that Alice, on the one hand, and Bob, Charlie, and Diana, on the other, will have, on repeating this process, a shared key. A calculation similar to the one presented in Sec. II shows that if an eavesdropper tries to entangle an ancilla with the four-particle GHZ state, then she will invariably introduce errors and her presence can be detected.

$$|\psi\rangle_4 = \frac{1}{4\sqrt{2}} \left[ \sum_j (|+x\rangle_j + |-x\rangle_j) + \sum_j (|+y\rangle_j + |-y\rangle_j) \right],$$

(21)
V. CONCLUSION

We have shown that GHZ states can be used to split information in such a way that if one is in possession of all of the parts, the information can be recovered, but if one has only some of the parts, it cannot. This applies to both classical and quantum information. In the case of classical information a shared key can be established between one party and several others, all of whom must work in concert. An eavesdropper or a cheater will introduce errors and can thereby be detected. In the case of quantum information the information in a qubit is split into two parts so that if the parts are recombined, the qubit can be recovered.

This represents a different kind of information splitting than occurs in quantum copiers [11]. There the object is to split the information in one qubit into two parts so that each part contains as much information about the original qubit as possible. However, in that case one cannot reconstruct the original qubit by combining the two copies.

The key point in all of this is that multiparticle entangled states can be used to split information into parts. This can be useful in maintaining security, as has been shown here, but there may be applications in the processing of quantum information as well.

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